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INTRODUCTION
When facing new problems, to reduce uncertainty and to save time,
companies, as well as individuals, are known to have some standard
solutions. Learning is seen as encoding inferences from history into routines
guiding behavior (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963; Levitt
and March 1988). Only when those routines fail are companies supposed to
seek new solutions, and accept to create new knowledge. But knowledge
creation has become a crucial aspect of organizations’ competitive
strategies. Huseman and Goodman (1999: 107) held that “knowledge, in the
form of relationship, know-how, and experience, has become an asset.”
In the 1980s, organizational learning and/or knowledge creation
emerged, indeed, as an important managerial and organizational issue
(Easterby-Smith, 1997; Schein, 1996; Senge, 1996). More and more,
organizations are supposed to have skill in experimentation with new
approaches, and in learning from best practices (Garvin, 1993). Still, until
recently, discussion about organizations usually referred to large firms. To
develop organizational and managerial theories, few studies used SMES for
conceptualizing and theorizing (Chaston, 1999; Pedler et al. 1997). Scholars
always mentioned large corporations as their frame of reference. Only in the
1990s did SMES become a fashionable research topic and a subject of
interest for policy makers. Within the new network economy, which is
extending its frontiers “  between markets and  hierarchies”, SMES are
expected to play a growing role in innovation and employment creation.
Despite the growing interest in SMES, we still need more data on
the way individual SMES deal with knowledge creation that results from
intentional and planned efforts to learn. Case studies may be useful where
the paucity of empirical data is a limitation. As Neilson (1997: 48) puts it,
"seeking in-depth understanding within the contextual bounds of the case
study provides a basis for developing new insights" as well as  “new
hypotheses and propositions to be tested in additional contextual
environments.”
Various definitions have been proposed for knowledge creation
and organizational learning /1/. According to Garvin (1998: 51) “a learning
organization is an organization skilled at creating, acquiring, and
transferring knowledge, and at modifying its behavior to reflect new
knowledge and insights.” Fiol and Lyles (1985) also give a very acceptable
definition of the concept of the concept: “Organizational learning means
the process of improving actions through better knowledge and
understanding.”   Knowledge is often accepted as being guided, among3
others, by cause-and-effect beliefs (Lyles and Schwenk, 1997; Sanchez et
al., 1996: 9). Learning is usually identified with change (Dixon, 1999;
Normann, 1985; Sanchez and Heene, 1997; Swieringa and Wierdsma,
1992). It can change the kind of knowledge a firm develops (Sanchez and
Heene, 1997: 7).
Here I will present the case of a high-tech French SME I will refer
as Allcapt. The data I will use was collected during a field research I
conducted between 1996-2000 in the company’s plant in (AB), a medium-
sized town situated in the central part of France, with its headquarters
situated in (BA), a Parisian neighborhood /2/. Allcapt’s experience may
constitute additional data for comparative approaches, where similarities
and differences in various patterns of knowledge creation process and
problem solving may be identified.
Allcapt designed the temperature sensors for the Vulcain engine of
Ariane V launchers. Developing new skills, know-how and competencies
by training the people resulted in success. But a rapid extension of the
company and of its (AB) plant represented a second challenge to the
management. Allcapt, who developed technical skills and knowledge, had
no expertise in Human Resource Management (HRM). Following a conflict,
that materialized with a strike, Allcapt decided to learn management skills
to deal with a very particular workforce (see below). At the present period
the company is dealing both with industrial relations and quality problems
/3/.
As Allcapt solved a technological innovation problem, the question
remains: Will the company be able to deal successfully with the
organizational and human aspects of learning and knowledge creation? The
present paper is part of an ongoing research on managerial strategies and
people’s (and union representatives’) reactions to them. For the study of
transition periods, as Yin (1989) stresses it, “the questions the investigator
will more frequently ask are ‘why’ and ‘how.’” The paper is more likely to
try to answer the ‘how’ questions: How did top management solve the
problem of the technological knowledge and skill gap in order to innovate?
How, after the rapid development of the company, and related industrial
relations problem, did managers interpret the events leading to conflict?
What strategies did they develop? How did Allcapt people implement them?
The study of these aspects is interesting if we have to answer the following
question: Does it make sense to speak about learning and knowledge
creating organizations, or is it more relevant to deconstruct learning in its
various dimensions and analyze them separately?4
 After giving a brief presentation of the company’s history and
evolution, and a description of the technological innovation challenge, I will
present the management’s attempts to create an appropriate HRM strategy.
Conflicting objectives, obstacles to collective sense making, and the
ambiguity of internal and external knowledge creation about human
resource management characterize this process.
A Brief Presentation of the Company and of its Evolution
The (AB) plant, which employs 360 people, is part of Allcapt, an
affiliate of an American holding since 1972. Allcapt specializes in the
design, development, manufacturing and marketing of measurement
systems and sensors for aerospace, space, and defense industries, as well as
for nuclear and marine applications, and for process industries, in general.
Their customers are well-known large firms such as Air Liquide, Airbus,
Alcatel, Matra Marconi Space, Rolls Royce, SEP (now a division of
SNECMA), and SNECMA, an engine manufacturer.
Allcapt and its (AB) factory date from 1960, when a French
engineer created the company. In 1965, in order to benefit from lower labor
costs in Spain, a subsidiary (hereafter referred to as Icapto) was created in
Madrid. Before retiring, in 1972, the owner sold the company to an
American holding. Since 1975, Allcapt is organized in three divisions:
Aerospace division, nuclear division, and systems and sensors division for
marine applications.
The examples below represent two important events:
a) The temperature sensors for the Vulcain engine (developed for
the European launcher Ariane V by SEP, Société Européenne de
Propulsion) represent a successful case of innovation in conditions of total
uncertainty (Bagla-Gokalp, 1999). The existing tools being useless, Allcapt
had to go through an innovation. The company learned through licensing,
trial-and-error and by doing.
In the 1980s, the Ariane V launcher was a big project for ESA
(European Space Agency). The French group CNES (National Center for
Space Studies) opted for a new design for the Vulcain engines, using liquid
oxygen and liquid hydrogen, together with a new design for the turbo-
pumps. New instrumentation capable of functioning in extremely harsh
conditions was needed to provide information on the engine’s internal
conditions and deliver this data to the computers controlling the launcher.5
However, as the engine itself had not yet been developed by SEP, no
precise data about the temperature of burned gases and cryogenic fluids, the
pressure, the vibration level, and the velocity, was available, except those
provided by numerical modeling and simulations based on extremely
simplified hypotheses.
SEP wished to use both thermocouples, smaller and easier to
integrate in less accessible locations in the engine, and resistance
temperature detectors (RTDs), which are much more precise. Contrary to
aircraft, there was no knowledge about what kind of measurement will be
accurate, and in which parts of the engine one should insert the sensors. The
thermocouples and RTDs were designed to measure cryogenic temperatures
of liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen (about - 150°C) the propellants used
in Vulcain engine. They are pumped from reservoirs by turbo-pumps and
atomized into the combustion chamber through several hundreds of co-axial
atomizers. No existing sensor was able to operate in the expected
conditions. Given the uncertainty of the conditions within the engine, it was
difficult to specify a priori the characteristics the sensors would require.
Conversely, the development of the Ariane engine required sensor
information to ensure safety constraints will be met. Thus, development of
the engine and sensors had necessarily to proceed together, step by step.
As Allcapt had a privileged relationship with SNECMA for more
than 15 years (see below), the company was encouraged by SNECMA to
consider SEP’s bid. Specializing in processing thermocouples since the
1970s, Allcapt was, indeed, a credible candidate. Allcapt’s management
took advantage of the existence of Icapto, the above-mentioned Spanish
company affiliated to Allcapt. ESA’s European funds had been distributed
mainly to countries such as France and Germany. When Allcapt’s managers
applied for the SEP bid, they specified Icapto as the supplier of required
sensors. In that way SEP would subcontract a Spanish company. They knew
that allowing Spain to participate would give a big advantage to Allcapt, in
addition to a good quality/cost ratio. When a second campaign was
launched by SEP, having already been contracted for thermocouples,
Allcapt applied again, adding that they would be assisted by one of the
company’s American suppliers (hereafter referred to as Nimco), who
designed RTDs for industrial applications. Allcapt was contracted to
develop all the required temperature sensors.
b) After this technological innovation, Allcapt was more confident,
and the managers decided to expand. One should not forget that between
1986-93, when hit by the economic recession, Allcapt fired 70 employees6
out of 180, and it was not until 1993 that a recruitment campaign took place,
to return to the number of employees Allcapt had before the recession.
In 1993, to import new expertise, Allcapt acquired a company that
specialized in pressure transducers. In 1995, it created a second joint
venture in Russia (the first being created in 1988). In 1997, Allcapt acquired
a US company that specialized in fluid regulators, and the pressure product
line of a French company. More recently, in 1999, Allcapt overtook two
other companies, one in France, one in England, meaning that within the
last five years Allcapt bought four new companies. Today, the company has
about 20 service networks in France as well as abroad, to compete in global
markets.
Allcapt is continuously growing, and the engine of the change is
the Aeronautic Equipment Division (AED). Since the second half of the
1990s, the (AB) plant managers modified the company charts several times
and tried to improve the organization of work and of the (AB) plant.  Very
recently, the executives opted for a matrix organization /4/. Between 1997-
1998, the company hired 90 people, and moved, in January 1998, into a
new, much bigger plant. In 1999, the staff of the (AB) plant doubled to
reach 360. The (AB) plant also introduced a team approach: “Now we have
teams of 15-20 people with their objectives, and they are responsible of the
final result for given products. They are working on team priorities, team
spirit, setting objectives in quality, quantity, and time schedules. They have
to conduct the production from A to Z, and this adds a kind of competition
among various teams, as the performances of each will be publicized”
(Industrial Manager, January 2000).
Allcapt had a very bureaucratic personnel office. Following the
rapid growth, the Finance Manager, whose office is in (BA), has been in
charge of HRM. While everybody seemed to be proud of the new, very
modern high-tech plant that attracted important visitors and local
politicians, the plant managers had to face a strike, followed by more than
90% of the operators in the shop floor. The meeting between union
representatives and the Finance Manager at (BA) was a failure. Following
the strike, the CEO contacted a private consultancy group I shall refer to as
M&M. After an audit, the group diagnosed that Allcapt needed innovative
strategies in HRM. M&M recommended some actions and formulated
several proposals that the company is trying to implement.7
Technological Problem Solving and Innovation
For years Allcapt worked for one single important customer,
SNECMA, a French engine manufacturer. In 1972, Allcapt was contracted,
indeed, by SNECMA (mainly because its founder graduated from the same
engineering schools as several of their managers) to process temperature
sensors (thermocouples) licensed by an American company:  “SNECMA
furnished the drawings and all the details on the conception” (Industrial
Manager). During the initial stages of the company’s development,
Allcapt’s management drew heavily on networking and personal knowledge
to reduce uncertainty and risk. During this “mono-customer period”, as the
managers call it, the company operated in a very comfortable (almost
routine) context “with this friendly customer who represented more than 70
per cent of Allcapt’s sales” (Technical Manager, 1999).
With the SEP bid, facing a challenge, the (AB) plant engineers and
managers had to create new knowledge and competencies. After a painful
learning by trial-and-error period, Allcapt succeeded in designing and
processing sensors, and eventually got through a product diversification, to
process, progressively, new sensors for potential customers /5/. Several
improvements to the sensors were realized, indeed, by substituting more
resistant alloys for the metals, and by more carefully insulating the wires of
the RTDs and thermocouples: “We did more than copying drawings and
instructions from licenses. We acquired a competency in processing both
the sensing elements of the temperature sensor and the materials. The SEP
project has been a springboard for us. We now manufacture our own
sensitive parts and continue to work on the composition of the ceramics to
adapt them to the specific needs of new customers” (Materials Manager).
How Allcapt came through this difficult experience? Through the
semi-structured interviews I conducted with (AB) plant managers and
engineers, I caught the various stages of innovation, where the slow
transition from routine and established solutions and behaviors to more
creative solutions, and to truly innovative behavior, was visible.
Learning from others, learning with others
To deal with uncertainty, Allcapt initially (in 1988-89) chose
platinum resistance RTDs developed by Nimco as the best candidate,
“because to wind platinum wire on ceramic mandrels, and to heat them to
high temperatures requires that the platinum and the ceramics have the
same coefficient of thermal expansion. Nimco developed the ceramic having8
this property. However, early formulations of this were not sufficiently
resistant to required conditions’ (Materials Manager, 1997). Allcapt then
tried to adapt these RTDs using existing know-how through licensing. In
1990, after a two-year development period, Allcapt’s RTDs failed in tests
specified by SEP, and Nimco was not interested in investing any more
resources for this product.
The Production Manager contacted an engineering school (NCIC)
in a small town close to (AB), which specialized in the development of
industrial ceramics. Two scholars, S1 and S2 from NCIC were offered
grants: S1 for the glass covering the mandrels, and S2 to improve the
ceramic mandrels. As the problem of the glass was relatively easy to solve,
I will focus on the ceramic mandrels. S2 was expected to formulate a new
powder with the appropriate proportions. Allcapt was short on time and had
to push S2 to accelerate the process. Nevertheless, S2 was not working full
time on this project, letting students and trainees deal with it. As the RTDs
had to be validated by SEP in 1995, in order to have a full-time researcher
on the SEP project, Allcapt contracted, in 1992, the present Materials
Manager, who was recently graduated from NCIC and who had been a
student of S2. He became a ‘translator’ helping two different cultures to
communicate /6/.
The difficulty to adapt the product to the needs of industry was the
next major problem. The Materials Manager recalls that at NCIC they were
used to tinkering and that they were not interested in industrial or standard
processing of the product they designed and developed. He had a hard time
to “transfer this technology from the laboratory to industry,” according to
his own words. In June 1993, the machines, ovens, and other technology
were bought to process the ceramic mandrels at (AB) plant, after adapting
them to Allcapt’s specific needs. Still, to process standard products was not
that easy, and the mastering of the various stages of the production and of
the details of the operations in order to produce a consistent powder and
ceramics took some time. Once his contract ended, the Materials Manager
left Allcapt.
In 1993, after testing the product, the first ‘critical review’ of the
RTD by SEP was not in favor of adopting it. The platinum was still not
resistant enough, and the sensor presented an insulation problem. In 1994,
the present Materials Manager was recruited, this time as Project Manager,
to deal with the development of the RTD. With the assistance of the product
quality person, he conducted product validation studies, where he
discovered the number of operations to process the RTDs, and the necessity
to develop an expert understanding of each process step: “It was a great9
learning experience. Her method was interesting: to cut the product in a
multitude of components and parts, to see where the problem is coming
from. Before that, I concentrated on the mandrels. I then realized that this
was just a very small part of the RTD. I got a broader view of the product” (
Materials Manager).
It appeared to Allcapt’s management that there would be no perfect
sensor, because “this is not an exact science: there are several parameters
to control such as resistance, conductance, and strength; one cannot have
them all within a single material. One has to find a compromise among
these parameters. It’s a genuine trial and error process” (Industrial
Manager, 1998). “ If you want to improve the glass, and eliminate the
bubbles, you have to leave it in the oven for a longer period. However, this
will damage the platinum wire... Even today, only slightly over one-third of
the total RTD output is delivered to the customer as ‘usable’” (Materials
Manager, 1998) /7/.
Negotiating Design and Accuracy
Allcapt’s managers rapidly learned that innovation is always a
compromise: “ For a new sensor to be designed, those who develop the
launcher will ask for the best and the most rapidly feasible sensor, those
who work directly on the engine will ask for the most accurate and reliable
sensor that is easy to use. The finance division will ask for the least
expensive sensor. These are people with different (and sometimes,
conflicting) concerns. Ultimately they must negotiate. The final decision is
always a compromise that blends scientific, economic, commercial, ‘human
relationa’,l and managerial aspects” (Production Manager).
RTDs not only necessitated a compromise among the parameters as
expressed by the Industrial Manager and the Production Manager, but they
also forced people dealing with various aspects of the innovation to
negotiate, in accordance with the expectations of those who analyse the
technology as a ‘social construction’ (Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, eds. 1987;
Mackenzie 1990, Mackenzie and Wajcman, eds. 1985) /8/. So, when the
product was refused by SEP, Allcapt’s managers were under great pressure,
thinking that SEP was ready to abandon them and that they had to prove
their trustworthiness.
The major problem was the pressure level set to test the sensors. To
Allcapt’s management, it was clear that SEP should accept to lower it.
There was no option, indeed, to delay Ariane V launch. The AED Manager
of the general management team with its headquarters at (BA) defended the10
idea that to be able to innovate one has to accept some flexibility: “Given
technological and time constraints, processing new RTDs that match SEP’s
expectations was not feasible” (AED Manager).
Allcapt had to negotiate with SEP in order to lower the pressure
constraints by modifying the ‘measurement points’ (i.e. the various
locations in the engine where the temperature sensors were to be placed)
and the AED Manager knew that SEP’s Instrumentation Division Manager
was the appropriate person to negotiate. Moreover, the AED Manager had
known him for many years and was able to anticipate his reactions /9/: “By
experience I know that you always have to negotiate at the management
level. The engineer who calculated the pressure levels the sensors would
face was a young theoretician, not very well acquainted with practical
problems. It is very hard to negotiate with engineers when they imagine that
if they lower the standards, they will lose their credibility, and that this may
damage their career. If his boss tells him to do this, he will be freed of the
responsibility if something goes wrong” (AED Manager, 1996). Together
they sought the acceptable solution: The initial pressure level in the
measurement points indicated by SEP engineer was 400 bar. After
negotiations, the maximal pressure was lowered to 240 bar, a level the RTD
could resist. The success of the compromise was evident when the product
was accepted in December1994, and Allcapt began the processing of
sensors in 1995.
Dealing with Complexity
According to the already mentioned managers, working for SEP
for RTD innovation has been an invigorating experience. They think that
after this successful innovation helped Allcapt achieve a reputation as a
reliable and serious company. They are eager to credit this project with
helping Allcapt to accept uncertainty, to deal with complexity and to
develop a culture more based upon challenges and aggressive strategies,
rather than routine solutions in a protected environment. This experience
introduced a true break out: “ In our company’s life, one can easily
distinguish two periods: before SEP, and after. When we were working for
SNECMA, we wouldn’t know what it means to have a relationship with
other companies. It was a relationship between two equivalent units or
rather, between two individuals with similar functions in each company.
With the SEP project we began to discover the complexity of our
relationship with our customers, and our customers’ customers. We learnt a
lot about the complexity of networks (…). This was an apprenticeship to11
complexity. Things got even more complex when the first RTDs failed and
when we contracted NCIC. For the first time we also worked with academic
researchers with their different culture, and learnt to co-operate with them
(…).  We have learnt about analyzing situations, to make choices, and to
accept the entire responsibility of our choices. This was a huge cultural
change (…).  When the top management understood that we had now
achieved a new level of maturity, they were more eager to design new
strategies” (Production Manager, 1998) /10/.
The SEP contract has also been an opportunity to acquire new
technology and knowledge. One such example was the acquisition of
specialized software for modeling. For the RTDs designed for Vulcain 1,
the company sub-contracted a Belgian firm. In 1997, Allcapt invested in
this technology, and the engineer in charge with modeling has been trained
to master and use the computer programs such as  Pro Mechanica. Pro
Engineer enables getting 3D imaging of all the parts and components, and
the project managers are proud of being closer to reality. The role of R&D
also increased rapidly in areas such as high temperature and cryogenic
ceramics and ultraviolet pyrometers.
The project managers have been transformed into multi-skilled
people: “ If you look at the background and career of our first project
managers, you can see the evolution: 15 or even 10 years ago, they would
be promoted from the ranks of good technicians, who had a very good
insight of the product. Today, the technical dimension is less important and
we stress that they have to be very good communicators, inside as well as
outside (…) And they must be fluent in English” (Technical Manager, 1998).
The expertise the company sought from their R&D people also changed, as
Allcapt hired people specialized in specific domains of expertise, e.g.
materials, optics, etc.  “The adoption of ISO 9001 would not have been
possible without this expertise” (Technical Manager, 1998). One of the
consequences of this project was, indeed, the ISO 9001 accreditation in
1992, making sure that Allcapt meets the new European standards.
Dealing with Human Resource Management Problems
As Allcapt’s main challenge is to manufacture reliable sensors,
workers’ craft, skill and knowledge are considered the company’s most
important assets. Competence building and “the culture of individual and
collective responsibility  have been one of Allcapt’s initial challenges”
(Industrial Manager, 1996).12
Competence building without human resource management:
The production workers and operators are called ‘ compagnons,’
this term referring to highly skilled craft people producing unique products.
The official propaganda stresses the role of experience, manual dexterity
and practical and tacit knowledge /11/ [where formal, written information is
an inadequate source (Collins 1992, pp. 56-58, see also Bagla-Gökalp
1996a, 1996b)], but also individual responsibility for every stage of the
process: “We want our people to understand the importance of following
exactly the instructions indicated by the Engineering unit. They have to be
conscious of the fact that we are producing ‘a five-legged sheep.’
Everything is ‘in the hands’ of our compagnons. If the worker accepts that
each of his/her actions, movements, or decisions will impact the final
product, s/he will not, for example, twist a wire with more strength than is
required. If he errs, he should be able to inform his boss, even if the error is
not detectable. To this end, to improve communication patterns and the
human relations was a necessity” (Industrial Manager, 1996).
Patience and precision are so important in handling the very tiny
wires used for the sensors, that the company preferred to hire women who
had previously been employed in the textile plants of the area, as the textile
industry began to de-localize its operations to low-wage countries in the
1970s /12/: “The company completed their training by providing them with
some basic knowledge concerning the principles of electricity, the reading
and interpretation of the measurements provided by the instrumentation,
and of the drawings provided by the engineering unit” (Industrial Manager,
1997). Allcapt managers tried to adapt existing skills within the company.
As the sensing element of the RTD consisted of platinum wire 17 microns
in diameter, wound around cylindrical ceramic mandrels, to handle the very
tiny components and wires the managers preferred to look to in situ human
resources and skills: they decided to train a female electronics operator at
Nimco (US), to become a ‘prototype technician.’
Later, she helped the company to hire two young persons to
process the sensing element. She had to evaluate their manual dexterity and
psychological capability to do this very specific job as there is no way to
thoroughly formalize and codify them. She then trained them. As it was not
easy to standardize the RTD manufacturing, one possible solution was to
always assign this job to the same operators, and this was indeed included in
the contract with SEP. The tacit knowledge of these operators was the
guarantee for the reliability of the product, and SEP maintained some
control over the processing of the sensors by controlling the identity of13
persons who manufacture them. For other complex operations, people from
technical schools were recruited and learned by doing, but the method was
long and costly, as no existing skill was fitting Allcapt’s needs.
The skill gap during the transition from school to factory is not
specific to Allcapt /13/. In the 1990s, with the implementation of new
products and the diversification of the sensors, the Industrial Manager
became more and more conscious that creating an education program with
in-firm knowledge acquisition by on-the-job learning and monitoring would
be the solution. To improve competency creation Allcapt decided to create
its own school with a more adapted curriculum. The Industrial Manager
made every effort to communicate the relevance of such a project. As soon
as the Ministry of Education accepted the project, Allcapt proposed a policy
called ‘qualification contracts’ to those who applied for technical positions,
and was helped by a lifelong education institute /14/. While employing
these young persons on a part-time basis, Allcapt provides them a two-year
education program, for a total of 900 hours, and eventually hires them
according to their performance. Each newly recruited person was then
assigned to someone senior with experience and who would train him. In
1997, when the experience began, they represented 40 % of AED’s
operators.
Interpreting the conflict
In January 1998, when Allcapt managers moved in a brand new
and pleasant plant, the Industrial Manager thought that they had a unique
work place in an economically depressed region. The plant attracted
important visitors such as the mayor, and other local officials and
politicians, and “the operators would spontaneously come and shake hands,
with a happy smile, and we were quite sure that things were going well.
With the spring 1999 strike we understood that their attitude was
superficial: they were not so happy as we thought.” Some managers still
think that this strike was the strike of rich people, as they have life long
employment in the plant, wages and working conditions that are above the
average of this region (AED Manager, 2000).
In March 1998, the union leaders felt that  “despite increasing
profit, workers would only get crumbs.” Moreover, they feared that to win
the incentive schemes the board of directors were trying to implement,
managers at all levels would push their subordinates and the team to work14
harder, to create  “more stress, frustration and inequality.” The union
bulletin emphasized the unacceptability of this functioning seen as a “threat
to the team spirit, the cohesiveness and unity, to the quality and hence, to
the competitiveness of the company.” Neither the Industrial Manager (who
was preparing his retirement as he is one of the oldest in the (AB) plant and
represents its memory and history and as such, has a charismatic power and
legitimate authority), nor the headquarters in the Parisian suburbs, and
particularly the CEO, were able to anticipate the strike.
The CEO opted for an auditing by the M&M consulting group, to
understand what was going wrong. He is known to be a very authoritarian
and strong personality and there is no doubt, his style of leadership and of
decision making shaped the way Allcapt produced knowledge by choosing
the M&M methods. M&M also influenced the process of organizational
learning as they brought their concepts and tools to contribute to the way
the company considers its functioning and problems. While the collective
nature of organizational learning and knowledge creation is largely
emphasized, top managers’ influence and instrumental role in creating new
organizational knowledge is well recognized (Cavaleri and Fearon, 1996;
Lyles and Schwenk, 1997; Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). It is primarily the top
management “ who interpret the importance of environmental events and
who communicate their view” (Lyles and Schwenk, 1997: 53), and “who
process organizational events through pre-existing knowledge systems”
(Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). Their theories, beliefs, and experiences
influence the information they select. Top management’s decision to imitate
or to borrow from consultant groups or to learn from the relevant business
literature, shape the process of knowledge creation. The management then
communicates the valued new knowledge through statements, symbolic
actions and speeches, and encourage it by rewards, incentives and bonuses,
to provide a basis for acceptable behavior and desirable actions for the firm
/15/.
For the audit, M&M consultants prepared a list of 80 people, who
were partly designated by the management and partly by balloting, the
majority coming from various levels of management. Semi-structured
interviews were conducted to conclude that the problems concern the
following points: a) the worker’s vanishing feeling of being part of Allcapt;
b) management problems; c) wages (including wage gaps between men and
women workers); d) communicating and sharing information; e) job
organization f) time management; g) human relations. Moreover, the
separate doors to access to the plant as well as the perceived separation
between the shop floor and the engineering specifications and procedures15
unit (who gives the job instructions and the methods) were not easily
admitted by the majority of workers. They were expecting more equity,
expressing their need to be respected for their important contribution to the
company’s performances, and to be recognized as persons and workers. In
November 1999, when I interviewed him about the situation before the
conflict, the Industrial Manager added that the workers were also
complaining about “the existence of taboo subjects” and about “the practice
of promoting by nepotism rather then merit.”
The Industrial Manager gave his own analysis for the reasons
leading to the strike. According to him the problem was due to: a) the rapid
increase of a heterogeneous population (“The operators and the engineers
don’t have the same life nor the same career and it’s difficult to make them
cohabitate…Because of the growing number of workers coming from
different worlds and having different lives, we had large teams. New
recruits hired after the qualification contract constituted 30 to 40 % of the
team, some people having to manage up to 60 people without any
preparation”); b) the power strategies of senior operators expected to
behave as mentors for juniors to complete the training program (“Some of
them held the juniors in contempt. We were not smart: the best operator is
not automatically the best mentor. And I have to mention this, the young
people we recruited came from technical schools. This means that they are
not good in mathematics, not good in French etc. They go to technical
schools because they failed elsewhere, and not by choice. So you have the
worst category. These guys are not the kind of population developing a
respect for authority or for the institution and are difficult to manage. Don’t
forget that they we had to meet 220 of them to choose 22”); c) the wage
differences between the senior operators and the juniors who were
pretending to have the same competencies and to do the same job (“Some of
them became really efficient and make 8.000 FF, i.e. 6.400 FF in real
terms, and they just don’t accept the fact that the seniors doing the same job
earn between 12.000 or 14.000 FF. Moreover, the operators don’t accept
geographical mobility: they want to stay here, in the region: to them, even
40 miles is not acceptable to look for a job. And engineers don’t come
easily here because the region is not attractive, and the turnover is high. So
we have to take care of them. But the operators also refuse the idea that
engineers must have higher wages because of their initial formal education
and diploma” (Industrial Manager, November 1999).
In October 1998, when the CEO wrote a synthesis of the M&M
diagnosis to be diffused at the (AB) plant, he insisted on the following:
“Our company has a technical/engineering culture. Sometimes several16
members of the same family work at (AB). Technical know-how, the nature
of technology and the technical conditions of work are perceived as being
good. The management style is qualified as ‘technocratic’ and
‘authoritarian’, with no delegation of power and this was inadequate as our
operators’ know-how, dexterity and experience are crucial to increase
productivity and the accuracy of our products. They were not asked to
express themselves and their ideas and suggestions were not taken into
account… Alongside this skilled people, we also have a large number of
young people who also need a relevant management style. Both consider the
plant as part of their life and are not willing to change their job. They want
everybody being considered with equal worth and dignity.” The CEO
followed the recommendations of M&M and stressed that he wanted “true
human resource management strategy to target individual and collective
efficiency.” He asked M&M to educate the (AB) plant managers of all level.
Following M&M’s advice, the CEO also decided to recruit a
Human Resource Manager, as the Financial Manager was not supposed to
be the right person to play this role /16/. M&M wanted Allcapt to recruit a
HRM “coming from the industrial world, to amanage work, workers and
their competencies in order to adapt Allcapt’s activities to the economic
evolution of markets.” S/He should be “a coach.” Among the competencies
he should have, the following were emphasized by M&M: “ Good
knowledge of labor relations law, good knowledge in human psychology,
sociology of organizations, in qualitative and quantitative methods of
personnel management, people’s training and formation, and the
willingness of analyzing the various jobs at (AB) and their evolution.” He
also had “ to use competency rather than power and be able to analyze
situations while remaining in the action.”
Union representatives (the dominant union being CGT, a strongly
left-wing union) reacted by stating that “the only people who would benefit
from the results of this audit is the boss of M&M” (a written document,
dated January 7, 1999): “We do not need the outcomes of this audit…The
top management throws money in organizing meetings with the consultants
to train managers and executives in communication skill. The best way
would be to find together new ways of solving problems, to save time, to
detect what’s missing, what’s useless, and to improve things… What we
want is to have good working conditions, to be respected, to participate in
company’s accomplishments and to take benefit of it, because the company
should return us a percentage of what we produced.”
‘Knowledge’ and ‘shared meaning’ creation attempts17
In organizations, decision makers adopt language to express beliefs
that they would like to be shared, and articulate and codify them to improve
the transfer process /17/. To construct collective knowing and “collective
meaning” (Dixon, 1999: 50), more and more organizations use “task forces,
committees, problem solving teams, self-managed work teams” (DeChant,
1996: 101). New knowledge is manifested in new structural arrangements,
new culture, and new collective action (Normann, 1985). Usually
consultants help the companies to define the tools. Swieringa and Wierdsma
(1992: 93) state that “ in the 1980s, consultants emerged, who applied
themselves more and more to linking directly educational activities and
consultancy work...The essence of learning organization is that the process
of organizational change coincides with the process of behavioral change.
The management of organizational change processes is, within a learning
organization, the leading of a collective learning process. Assistance with
these processes is an area in which advising and education coincide, and
therefore so do the profession of consultant and educator” (Swieringa and
Wierdsma, 1992: 137). Even though today’s organizations are labeled
“learning organizations,” to the employees sometimes learning may signify
“going back to school” and this feeling was also strong among managers
and operators at the (AB) plant.
 Following M&M recommendations, (AB) plant workers defined
and adopted a Charter of good behavior and continue to develop several
working groups: The “Improvement of everyday life” working group
(including security and health issues), the “Problem solving working group”
(including the elaboration of objective criteria for evaluation), the
“Encouraging acceptable and respectful behavior to improve human
relations” working group, the “Improvement of information circulation”
working group. They operate now with 13 coaches and almost 60
participants. These teams regularly meet to study important issues and
aspects of their sector of activity (temperature, pressure, etc.). Due to their
regularity, these meetings are expected to raise (AB) plant staff’s awareness
of crucial and emerging issues. Information, analysis and action to be taken
are discussed in these groups for agenda setting.
The outcomes of these working groups may be the creation of a
collective ability to raise questions, to analyze situations, to create relevant
information about them, and to propose agreed solutions, with workers
contributing to improving things. But workers complain that some of the
groups are not “natural” groups, as the head of a unit designated the people
with whom he will work (Document of the Problem Solving working group18
dated May 10th, 1999). In addition, there is a tendency to confuse the
problems specific to a shop floor, and the four major topics the working
groups are to handle. However, the meetings also have therapeutic effects:
in the written documents, the managers and team leaders were criticized for
lacking skills in communication, human relations, pedagogy, polite
behavior, respect and solutions.
Allcapt executives and managers from all levels also benefit from
an intensive training program, using methods such as Lacoursiere or
Blanchard who were adapted by M&M to deal with motivation and team
management who help developing a common interpretation of situations
and similar approaches to problems /18/. (AB) plant managers and team
leaders now refer to this model to perceive ‘reality.’ M&M also uses
leadership games with different models of personality /19/ to rise the
managers’ awareness of the importance of leadership style in order to
improve their relationship with the operators. The Industrial Manager
believes that  “being trained by the same group (M&M) creates a
homogeneity between (AB) and (BA) as well as between different divisions”
(November 1999). But managers from different levels did not easily accept
the idea of being trained.
According to one M&M consultant I interviewed in March 2000,
“Coming from prestigious engineering schools, Allcapt executives and
managers hated to be considered like learning kids. They are very
confidant, and they think they know the best of everything. When I gave
them an African game they reacted to mention that there is no time to play
when serious problems are waiting for solutions. And then they realized that
facing an unknown game they were in the same position as those who hear
from them new instruction. They are learners in an apprenticeship
situation.”
M&M wanted Allcapt to introduce employee evaluation schemes,
and one of the working groups was assigned to the task of contributing to
the definition of objective evaluation criteria. On January 13, 1999, the
industrial manager informed the worker’s representatives that the company
would prepare the evaluation guidelines for May 1999, to help managers
and team leaders to evaluate the competencies of their fellows, in order to
make better decisions about whom to promote. Union representatives
reacted very negatively, pretending that “ rewards according merit are
always subjective.” The first evaluation attempt was a true fiasco.
The Industrial Manager recalls that some operators protested the
results of their evaluations by placing them at the entrance hall. Indeed,
managers from all levels interviewed their subordinates before being19
prepared to conduct these interviews: “Rather then discussing, they were
judging each other. Filling the forms, the bosses pretended that the
operator was badly performing according to the chosen criteria. Workers
were angry. One worker put in the interview forms that his boss is a
‘Japanese ant,’ ‘he just says Hi! Before giving the instructions and leaves:
there is no communication’. Another hung his results with a conclusion:
‘after 17 years at the (AB) plant I’m a bad operator.’ When I arrived in
March the situation was similar to warfare. But as a charismatic leader
with a paternalistic management style, the Industrial Manager promised to
those who have been judged as bad workers, that he will deal with this issue
and the battle ended.”  (Human Resource Manager, November 1999).
A year ago Allcapt did recruit a HRM. Among other things, he had
to formalize skill and job descriptions for every post, so as to improve
recruitment policies, implement ‘objective criteria’ for job evaluation,
develop more adapted wage policies (i.e., considering the possibilities to
implement the principle of wage according to merit), work through a better
time management for all categories of workers (particularly because of the
35 hours working week who now is official). He also had to improve the
communication in the plant because the workers were critical about the
quality of information and its relevance or clarity, and on that particular
point M&M put that  “one of the functions of management being sense
making, messages and information must be clear and understandable.” The
HRM is concerned about information sharing, and was enthusiastic when he
informed me that “there is no taboo subject: We discuss every single topic.
If you tell them that within five years the cost of manufacturing a plane
engine was reduced by half, they understand it, they know what it means”
(November 1999).
The HRM wants to create his own methods “based on respect of
the other and direct verbal communication” (February 2000). He is proud
of spending several hours every day in the shop floor, watching operators in
their work stations, discussing with them, observing the human relations,
and observing human interaction in the company’s restaurant during
lunchtime: “I want to see and to be seen. I want to observe situations, and
to analyze their meaning.” As Ferris and Fanelli (1996, pp 75, 79) claim,
“the true learning managers get out on the floor where the work is being
done, and pay attention to people and their problems; they get to know
employees through their work and the problems they encounter in
producing products and services.” The HRM discovered the importance of
tacit knowledge (though he had not heard this concept), by observing people
at work: “The operators use their senses to gather information and data:20
The sound of the machine at a certain point, the surface aspect of the
artefact they are constructing…Their eyes, fingers and ears try to feel what
the operation needs to be. They create relevant knowledge that can not be
formalized and transferred” (March 2000).
 The HRM inherited some concepts and action introduced by
M&M: “The tools have been set before my arrival. It’s okay when it comes
to use the methods of coaching, supporting and delegating, and to the
Blanchard Method with D1/D2/D3/D4. But for the remaining, I have my
own vision of things. And what’s important to me is not the tool as a tool,
but the human being capable of taking action. We don’t need a
sacralization of the tools and my feeling is that to the person from M&M
you interviewed, bringing tools and applying methods have became an end
for themselves.” /20/ (March 2000).  As Dixon (1991: 167) states, when one
is supposed to learn from management expert ready-made answers, this can
be in contradiction to the concept of organizational learning. He is now in a
difficult position, because the managers are being trained by M&M,
whereas the HRM has his own ideas, methods, and rhetoric about the same
issues. The (AB) plant staff is aware of this ambiguity, as the HRM does not
feel comfortable with the intervention of the M&M, whose consultants
behave as they have the power to influence the HRM’s action.21
CONCLUSION
The relationship between knowledge creation and learning is a
complex one. The nature of knowledge organizations create depends upon
the questions they raise, the way they interpret and attribute meaning to
ongoing processes, the information they decide to gather as being relevant,
the sources of knowledge they choose, and the nature of collaboration they
develop. Allcapt’s case indicates that organizational learning and
knowledge creation may be identified with the attempts to constantly try to
adapt to evolving situations and ongoing changes, and to prepare the future
of the organization. But the company failed to generalize the ability to learn
and create knowledge that was developed around a first successful
experience. In Allcapt’s case, one easily see two different models of
knowledge development and learning: technological and organizational.
The first was tackled by engineers who tried to learn through licensing, as
well as through cooperation with research centers, and through importing
skill, know-how, and knowledge. The company was not in a position of
inferiority: rather it had the power. Moreover, the technological challenge
was accepted by the (AB) plant as it was very rewarding to work for Ariane
V. This was consistent also with the company’s technological culture. After
a painful trial-and-error period, Allcapt finally developed the new products
the customers needed. There was much pride about this event. Despite all
the difficulties the company faced and the resulting stress, the industrial
relations were good.
For the second, i.e. organizational aspect, the top management
plays an important role, and shapes the structures to be set as well as the
methods to be used. Information about managerial skill, and knowledge
about workers’ competencies are imported from M&M, but in this case
there is a power relationship between M&M and the (AB) plant managers.
Technological learning seemed to be more neutral than learning managerial
skill, and easier than adapting one’s competencies and behavior to the
model set by an outsider, whose legitimacy is not easily accepted. Not only
managers from all levels doubt the efficiency of the training, but the
operators are also suspicious about the new evaluation criteria. Even among
the management and engineers, the idea of being judged not only for their
technical skill and know-how but also for their relational and
communication skills is not easily accepted.
The problem becomes further complicated when one knows that
the newly recruited HRM, who spent almost a year to understand the nature
of the company’s operations and the skills they need, as well as the nature22
of human relations, would like to take action following the outcomes of his
analysis, rather than following M&M vision of things. He is a very sensitive
person who likes to repeat that he loves people. He is very communicative
and does not put distance between himself and people. He is comfortable
negotiating with engineers as well as operators and union leaders, as he is
very adaptable, and respectful of people. External knowledge and rhetoric
circulates with his analysis and rhetoric, and Allcapt employees hardly
distinguish between internal and external knowledge. This ambiguity is
worsened by the retirement of the Industrial Manager in June 2000. The
Industrial Manager will not be replaced. Thus, in addition to the power
conflict between M&M and Human Resources Manager, one will
eventually have to consider the ‘sense making’ struggle (which could
eventually become a power struggle) between the Human Resource
Manager and the second most powerful person of the (AB) plant, the former
Production Manager (who is now Operations Manager for Allcapt and
Icapto). He has been at (AB) for many years (whereas the human resource
manager is the most recent person to have been recruited), and he is closely
involved in the competency evaluation criteria definition, and in the
development and functioning of the working groups who are part of HRM.
One can consider that the (AB) plant may face a problem of ambiguity of
power, and even a schizophrenic situation created by the presence of M&M,
when for the creation of a shared meaning, the need for a legitimate leader
and the unity of power becomes necessary.23
NOTES AND REFERENCES
/1/ As Sanchez and Heene put it, “ The topic of organizational
learning and knowledge has received much recent attention from a number
of perspectives, including economic and organization theory (Boisot, 1995),
organization studies (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), technological change
(Durand, 1993),  social systems (von Krogh and Vicari, 1993),  cognition
(Walsh, 1995). According to Senge (1990:1), “learning organizations are
places where people continually expand their capacity to create the results
they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are
nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are
continually learning how to learn together” using systems thinking,
personal mastery, mental models, shared vision, and team learning. Senge
(1990:14) stated that  "through learning we re-create ourselves, we re-
perceive the world and our relationship to it", concluding that a learning
organization is an “organization that is continually expanding its capacity
to create its future.” To Marshal  et al (1997: 230) the management of
knowledge would mean “  the attempt to recognize what is essentially a
human asset buried in the minds of individuals, and leverage it into an
organizational asset.”   Lassey (1998: 3) insists upon the importance of
collective learning in organizations, and puts training as a crucial part of
learning, adding that successful organizations are proactive learners: They
plan their learning, develop skills which they will need in the future, they
harness the informal learning networks, and utilize the existing competence
of staff to maximize the development potential of organization, encouraging
and supporting learning through the monitoring and appraisal system and
through the organization's culture (its beliefs and attitudes): “Organizations
only exist in the minds of its members in the sense that without cooperation
between the individuals that make up the organization, it cannot function.
The organization itself only manifests itself in the behavior of its people. So,
if an organization learns, there is a mutual changing of behavior”,
therefore “organizational learning is equivalent to organizational change”
(Lassey, p 6, p 8). "Organizational learning and collective learning begins
when there is a recognition that the rules no longer lead to behavior that
produces the correct results and the collective behavior and the rules that
govern that behavior are changed at the same time.” (Lassey, p 10).
Argyris (1977) proposed that organizational learning is a process of
detecting and correcting errors. Nixon (1999:1) states that learning is sense
making: it is the process that leads to knowledge. Senge (1990)
distinguishes adaptive (or reactive) learning that is about responding to the24
environment, from generative learning that is about anticipating the future
environment, the learning style being closely related to the management
style. Lyles and Schwenk (1997) also refer to the peripheral knowledge
structure. The core set contains knowledge about the most basic of the
firm’s purposes and goals, while the peripheral set contains knowledge
about sub-goals and about the behavior or steps necessary to achieve those
goals. The peripheral structures are open to much more debate and
disagreement than is the core set (p 59)  Huseman and Goodman (1999:
107) define knowledge as  “information laden with experience, truth,
judgment, intuition, and values; a unique combination that allows
individuals and organizations to assess new situations and manage
change.” Experience is seen as the essential bridge between what happened
in the past and what is happening in the present. The truth is defined as the
critical understanding that bridges the gap between objectives and results.
Judgment is the ability to make sense of a situation that is completely
unfamiliar. They see in values the lenses through which we view the world,
one of the main guides when gathering knowledge, as they dictate the ways
in which we determine what is important and test actions. Huseman and
Goodman (1999, 73) believe that "one major roadblock to organizational
learning is mental models" working as obstacles "to stay in sync with the
outside world (...) Once a company has adapted to a new environment, it is
no longer the organization it used to be; it has evolved. This is the essence
of learning.” (De Geus, 1997). Cavaleri and Fearon (1996:15-16) define
organizational knowledge as  “the capacity for effective action over time,
that results from the collective knowing, experience, and reflection of all
members of an organization .” Mason (1993: 843) coined the concept of
strategic learning to describe “the process by which an organization makes
sense of its environment in ways that broaden the range of objectives it can
pursue or the range of resources and actions available to it for pursuing
these objectives.” One important distinction was to oppose single loop
learning to double loop learning (Argyris, 1994). Single loop learning is
when management reacts to existing system and detects and corrects its
errors, while double loop learning prompts organizations to ask fundamental
questions about policies and modifies the organizations’ underlying norms
and objectives. Effective double loop learning is a reflection of how people
think –that is, the cognitive rules or reasoning they use to design and
implement their actions (Argyris, 1998: 84). It is supposed to be painful:
“Double loop learning tends to be rather messy and untidy and not
amenable to formulaic approaches” (Douglas and Wykowski, 1999: 12).
Swieringa and Wierdsma (1992 : 39) recall that double loop learning is25
typically concerned with conflicts, disputes and contradictions between
individuals, departments, factions and other groups. Lassey (1998:10),
Swieringa and Wierdsma (1992) add the triple loop learning when the
essential principles and the role or the mission of the organization are
questioned. But Neilson (1997) states that with these approaches one can
not see how organizations know when to employ one of these theories.
/2/ To analyze the single most important innovation case, the
design of temperature sensors for Vulcain, the engines to be used for Ariane
V launchers, I conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews in 1996-97
and again, in 1999, representing a total of 18 hours of tape-recorded data. In
1996-97, the Aerospace Equipment Division Vice-President (hereafter AED
manager), the  Industrial manager  of (AB) plant, the Deputy-production
manager, who now is the Production Manager, and the Materials manager
who is working for the R&D unit and who reports to the technical manager
have been interviewed twice. Both the  Production manager and the
Materials manager have been interviewed a third time, in 1999. In May
1999, I also interviewed a Project manager working at (AB) plant since
1998, and the  Technical manager, who is also in charge of European
programs. As part of my fieldwork, I also organized one visit to the
company’s headquarters at (BA) in a Parisian neighborhood, and three visits
to the (AB) plant (two visits to the old plant and one visit to the new one, as
in 1998 Allcapt moved to this larger plant situated in the same town), to
observe people working or interacting, and to have informal discussions
with the staff. AED, the most important and rapidly expanding division of
the company, with a turnover of US $ 50 Million (projection 1998-99),
representing 63.5 per cent of the total turnover, currently has 340 employees
which is more than the total number of employees of Allcapt in 1994 (317).
The division employs 115 production workers, and 60 engineers and
technicians at the (AB) plant. The first part of the paper has been presented
in a modified form in Leeds (Bagla-Gokalp, 1999). To analyze the ongoing
organizational and managerial changes which constitute the second part of
this paper, I re-visited the new (AB) plant 7 times: November 24, 1999;
January 14th, 2000; February 2 and 16, 2000; March 3, 8 and 21st, 2000.
During Winter 2000, the Aerospace Equipment Division (AED) manager
became the Aerospace business group vice-president and is now responsible
of marketing, R&D and commercial action of the whole company. The
former Technical manager replaced him in this position. The management
committee, which is at (BA) includes the manager of aerospace business
group, the finance and purchasing manager, the development manager, the26
quality assurance manager, the recently hired Human Resources Manager,
the Industrial Manager of (AB) plant, the operations manager for (AB) and
Icapto (who is the former production manager in my interviews), the
systems and sensors division managers the nuclear division manager and the
aerospace equipment division (ex technical manager).
/3/ The company loses money because of an important decrease in
quality, interpreted as workers’ resistance by the union leaders. When I
interviewed the After Sales Service Manager, he informed me that there is
no clear knowledge about that, no criteria to evaluate or quantify the
problem, but just some chats and rumors. He thought the company would
need a clear and shared definition and formal knowledge about this topic.
The Industrial Manager gives his own theory: “Our young operators were
really careful when they were hired, before the employment contract was
signed. Once they got the job, they behave, I guess, like the driver who is
very careful the day he’s willing to obtain his license and than once he has
the license he drives less carefully and even, take risks.” The company
asked the present quality manager to produce detailed quantitative data that
he prepared at the end of March 2000 and the company was looking
forward to recruit a new Quality manager with extended functions.
/4/ Imitation is a common behavior for organizational design
issues. Moss-Kanter claimed that matrix organization structures "were first
developed to aid technological innovation -the large-scale development
projects in the aerospace industry- and are found more frequently in rapidly
changing, highly innovating organizations” (Kanter, 1996: 100). Also,
"dividing the organization into smaller (but complete business) units based
on a common end use goal but not around function or specialty aids
activation of innovation by producing structural integration at micro-level"
(p.101).
/5/ One of the targeted customers was Rolls-Royce,  “because
Rolls-Royce, aside from being European, was the second most important
aircraft engine manufacturer” (Technical Manager, 1999). Allcapt first
failed to interest Rolls-Royce, but progressively, developed a new strategy
who happened to be successful after three years: “We presented the high-
tech aspect of the product, the teams who process it, the maintenance
services, etc. We even manufactured prototypes for them to try. We created
a ‘service’ relationship” (Technical Manager, 1999).27
/6/ For the concept of ‘translator’ see: Aitken 1976, 1985 and
Gökalp 1992, 1994. A sociological approach developed at the Centre for
Sociology of Innovation by French sociologists such as M. Callon and B.
Latour at l’Ecole des Mines in Paris use also the concepts of ‘translation’
and ‘translator’, the latter referring to a social actor who is at the core of an
innovation process that can be stabilized thanks to his/her translation when
the various human, as well non-human, actors, are aligned around the same
definition of a project (see: Callon 1986, Latour 1987).
/7/ ”During the initial periods, when SEP was waiting for 60 or
even 80 RTDs, we would give them only 30, because of processing failures.
We were doing exactly the same operations, and it was difficult to
understand why sometimes we would have good products, and sometimes
we would fail. Things are getting better but we know that we have to accept
losing 30 per cent of our products” (Materials Manager).
/8/ For analyses of innovation (theoretical approaches and case
studies) see: Aydalot and Keeble, eds. 1988, Biemans, Branscomb and
Keller, eds. 1998; Bucciarelli 1996, Dodgson and Bessant 1996, Fountain
1998, Gregersen 1992, Lundwall, ed. 1992, Miettinen 1996, Murray 1997,
Senker and Sharp 1998, Von Hippel 1977, 1998.
/9/ Trust has become a major theme in managerial studies. See for
example Blomquist, 1998 ; Krieger, 1988.
/10/ Kanter (1996: 105) speaks of a "culture of pride" in a
company's achievements and concludes that success breed success.
/11/ For this concept, see: Polanyi 1958, 1966. Tacit knowledge
can usually be represented in the form of graphs, presentations and other
formal data, or it can be embedded into systems, processes, etc. Knowledge
generation means, to Huseman and Goodman (1992:146), to turn tacit into
explicit, by constructing methods by which the most talented and
experienced employees may describe what they know. In this particular
case, the knowledge could not become explicit. As put by the Industrial
Manager: “Experience is important, as we are learning by doing, rather
than exclusively relying on R&D results. Only experience could teach
people, for example, that if the thermal treatment of the material is done
during a specific stage, this will cause a lengthening of its lifetime.”  See
also Bagla-Gökalp 1990, 1998. It is now widely accepted that knowledge28
creating companies follow four basic patterns that exist in interaction in
knowledge-creating companies: 1) From tacit to tacit which could be
transferred through apprenticeship (learning one's 'master's craft skills', but
it can not be leveraged by the organization as a whole; 2) From explicit to
explicit, which is again a combination that does not really extend a
company's existing knowledge base; 3) From tacit to explicit, allowing the
knowledge to be shared; 4) From explicit to tacit, the pattern meaning that
when a new explicit knowledge is shared throughout an organization,
individuals may use it to broaden and reframe their previous  tacit
knowledge (Nonaka 1998:28-29).
/12/  Bagla-Gokalp, 1993.
/13/ In his study of a sample of 20 new technology based firms in
the Aberdeen region, Keogh (1999) observed that SMES in this region tend
to rely on identifying needs based on existing staff profiles coupled with
loose projections for new business, based on their current financial
performance, to stress the limitations of this strategy in the identification of
human resource requirements.
/14/ In an interview for the advertisement brochure for 1999-2000
of a life-long education and training group, the  Industrial Manager
recognized that they helped Allcapt to solve the problem of skill gap, as no
available education program in schools would train the specialized
workforce the company needs for temperature and pressure sensors: “They
analyzed our skills and products and with the organization dealing with the
metallurgical sector we are part, they helped us to create a qualification
contract which is specific to the company’s operations. They helped us to
recruit 22 young people to be trained by mentors after the education
program.”
/15/ Schein (1993) insists upon the importance of communication,
as he refuses to see dialogue at the executive level as sufficient for a
learning organization.
/16/ When I interviewed him in November 1999, the HRM also
emphasized this mistake: “To me, training is an investment, to the finance
person it’s a cost. We are conscious about costs but our duty is relational,
human. So, in postponing the recruitment of a true human resources
manager, Allcapt thought that it was a cost-saving, while it’s the reverse.”29
/17/ “Codifiability” refers to “ the ability of the firm to structure
knowledge into a set of identifiable rules and relationships that can be
easily communicated “ (Kogut and Zander, 1997: 22).
/18/ The concepts used are: D1 (the enthusiastic beginner, with
high motivation but low competency level), D2 (the disillusioned learner,
with decreasing motivation while competencies progress), D3 (the knowing
professional, fluctuating according to problems to be solved and the
solutions that work, where the competencies are being consolidated; D4 (the
calm expert with stabilization of motivation and mastered competency). So,
team leaders were given instructions on how to behave according the four
stages. They were told that for D1 they have to learn to communicate by
presenting the targets with a clear, understandable vocabulary and relevant
concepts, to diagnosis the existing skills and competencies they can use and
set up the methods and fundamental tools. For D2 they awere told to let the
operators to express the difficulties they face, and explain the reasons
leading to the choice of a particular method. For D3 they were told to
encourage the learners to evaluate their results and to propose him a variety
of situations using case studies or simulated problems. For D4 they were
told to put in practice whatever is learnt.
/19/ The models are: “critical parent”, “caring parent”, “adult”,
“adapted child”, “little professor”, “spontaneous child.”
/20/ Starbuck (1997) quotes Orlikowski’s (1988: 179-267) study of
a consulting firm where she raises a similar issue. She details the firm’s
effort to capture its experience as software. Consultants built software
‘tools’ that help them. At first, isolated people used these tools voluntarily,
but informal norms gradually made their use mandatory. Thus, the tools
both expressed and reinforced the firm’s culture. Generalization made the
differences among clients’ problems less and less important. The
consultants stressed the tools’ strong influence on their perceptions of
problems and their methods of solving them.30
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